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WASHINGTON

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Declassified Case: NWW# 78134 Date:
18-25-2025

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of
Russia

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State
Steve Hadley, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Nikolay Sorokin, Interpreter

Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin, President
Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister
Sergey Prikhodko, Presidential Foreign
Policy Adviser
Anton Uspenskiy, Interpreter

DATE, TIME July 2, 2007, 10:45 a.m. - 12:40 p.m. EST,
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, ME

The President: Because the Iranians might know how to enrich,
why not start shipping fuel to Bushehr? (S)

President Putin: We were supposed to deliver fuel in 2005, but
have not delivered it in violation of our contract. We used
protests to delay delivery, and we did not want the Iranians to
have quantities of low enriched uranium (LEU). By year-end,
Iran will have 18 cascades and 3000 centrifuges, and will be
able to begin the enrichment process. Iran could produce enough
fissile material for one warhead by the end of 2008. We agree
we need to delay shipping fuel for the next 6 months or so, but
any further delay would be useless. Rod deliveries would,
however, give us leverage over them. There's no reason to open
up rods to take out LEU. They'd be shipped from Russia under
IAEA seal and operated under IAEA observation in the reactor.
If the Iranians tried to open up the rods, they would forfeit
their support within the international community and Muslim

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world, and they have no need once they can enrich. We could build in other proliferation protections, such as if the Iranians break relations with the IAEA, the rods come back to Russia. We also need a means to monitor the independence of the IAEA. (S)

The President: The problem is suggesting to Iran that cheating is okay, that they pay no penalty, and it sends a bad signal to other proliferators as well. The next 6 months give us time to pressure them. They also may not be as far along as we expect. So let's avoid a bad signal. (S)

President Putin: I agree. We have no intention to link. And Russia is willing to participate in the development of a new UNSCR with more stringent measures.

[REDACTED] (S)

FOIA(b)(1) STATE, NSC

Secretary of State Rice:

[REDACTED] (S)

President Putin:

[REDACTED] (S)

National Security Adviser Hadley: We need to get our "123" Agreement through Congress -- and this could hurt that. (S)

Secretary of State Rice: Kill it. (S)

President Putin: I understand. We would take that into account.

[REDACTED] (S)

The President: Thank you for sharing that with us. The Iranians could elect a different set of leaders, with whom we could have a relationship. (S)

President Putin: [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1) STATE

[REDACTED] What do we do on missile defense? (S)

The President: We have a way forward. Your experts think this is part of a broader, sinister plot. We have to open up to you and explore whether the Azeri radar site makes sense. Our effort is only to counter a single missile -- and we'd like a chance to convince your experts of that. If my experts are fooling me, then I need to know that too. (S)

President Putin: Your experts will not be able to convince ours that this is not aimed at our deterrent. But here's how we see it. Missile defense allows the United States to defend its territory and maintain U.S. leadership in Europe. This may not be bad for Russia. I don't know. Missile defense gives you a political and economic umbrella and leverage over Europe. If the system threatens Russia, we will respond with something. It won't necessarily be costly, and it won't necessarily damage our relations. You should ensure your leadership, but without antagonizing others. Let us join with you to address this issue not just bilaterally, but in the NATO context. We agreed on a launch information center in Moscow, but never did it. Let's do it. And let's establish a second center in Brussels. Link it in, and show how our radar can monitor the situation in Iran, as it did during the Iran-Iraq War. We're also willing to upgrade the Azeri radar, and we're also building a new launch monitoring center in Armavir in southern Russia. But if you pursue deployments in Poland and space, it would make this impossible.

(S)

The President: It would be hard for us to abandon the Czech and Polish deployments, but having a broader, regional shield would be a good thing. Our system would be overwhelmed by two to three missiles launches at the same time. But our experts have to convince you of that. I like the idea of doing it as part of a regional system. (S)

President Putin: I agree. And if we could cooperate in this area, this would put U.S.-Russian cooperation at the level of allies, for cooperation in the security sphere has that effect.

(S)

The President: I agree with this. U.S.-Russian relations will be critical in the future. The challenge is for the United States and Russia to work through these issues. I know there's a lot of suspicion of the United States in your country. One of the things we are trying to do between the two of us is to remove those suspicions. (S)

President Putin: I'm not talking about something tactical, but strategic -- something that looks into the future. There are no anti-U.S. elements in the Government. In the Duma, yes. In the Government, some people get annoyed, but they are not anti-American. (S)

The President: We need to talk about Kosovo. I think we can't go back -- it has to be independence. We don't need to resolve it here, but we need to discuss it. (S)

President Putin: I agree. We have discussed it, and we will ask our ministers to pursue it. I've met with both Tadic and Kostunica, and I did not find any differences, even in nuance. (S)

The President: I understand Saakashvili has been more reasonable. (S)

President Putin: Yes, he is moving in the right direction, but there is still violence. We are exchanging signals that we want relations to improve on both sides. I do not want to dismiss problems with CFE. If the Baltic states weren't part of the USSR, then they should ratify the Adapted Treaty. You've talked about the Istanbul Commitments, but they aren't in the Treaty. There's nothing on paper, there was never any signature to that, which is another problem. We will implement the Istanbul Commitments, but as a separate matter. We have implemented each one -- we've withdrawn bases from Georgia, and agreed to withdraw the other two; we've implemented the commitments in Transnistria, either evacuating or destroying heavy weapons. Russia has implemented CFE completely. I can show you the facts. I agree that our Ministry of Defense should not have denied requests for inspections; we will comply with the treaty and give 150 days advance warning before suspending it. And if partners do not implement their obligations, we will suspend it indefinitely. We have met our obligations. If partners aren't interested in meeting theirs, we will not be bound. (S)

-- End of Conversation --